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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gene Olson appeals from district court's order revoking 
probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of seven years, with one 
year fixed, upon his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, 
Olson argues the district court erred by failing to give him credit toward his 
sentence for 250 days he spent incarcerated in Washington as a sanction for 
violating the conditions of his community custody in that state. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After Olson pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.60-71, 
72-83, 86-97, 100-110; Tr., p.52, Ls.14-23.) The court suspended the sentence 
and placed Olson on probation for four years. (Id.) Shortly after he was placed 
on probation, Olson transferred his supervision to the State of Washington 
through an Interstate Compact agreement. (R., pp.113, 116, 196; Tr., p.62, 
Ls.20-23.) 
While residing in Washington, Olson did not do well on probation. (R., 
pp.113-66; Tr., p.56, Ls.56, Ls.20-22.) On or about March 24, 2010, Washington 
authorities arrested Olson for committing new felony crimes and for violating 
numerous other conditions of his community custody. (R., pp.116, 125-34.) 
Following a hearing on April 9, 2010, the Washington Department Of Corrections 
found Olson guilty of 11 separate community custody violations. (R., pp.141-43, 
200.) As a sanction, the Washington hearing officer recommended that Olson 
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be "[r]eturn[ed] to sending state (Idaho) to serve [the] remainder of [his] 
p.143; also pp.141, 200.) In the alternative, hearing 
officer ordered Olson to be confined for 250 days in the Okanogan County Jail. 
(R., pp.141, 143, 200.) It appears from the record that Olson was confined in the 
Okanogan County Jail on both the community custody violations and the new 
felony charges until at least November 2010. (R., p.116, 197.) 
On April 19, 2011, the Interstate Compact Program Coordinator for the 
Idaho Department Of Correction (IDOC) filed a report of violation alleging that, 
between April 2008 and March 2011, Olson had committed 14 separate 
violations of the court ordered conditions of his probation. (R., pp.113-17.) A 
Warrant Of Arrest For Probation Violation was issued on April 20, 2011 (R., 
pp.170-71) and was served on Olson in the State of Washington on or about 
April 25, 2011 (R., pp.197, 202-03). Olson waived extradition but was not 
transported to Idaho until June 2012. (R., pp.197, 202-03.) 
On June 25, 2012, IDOC officials filed a second report of probation 
violation alleging that, on May 12, 2011, Olson had been convicted of two new 
felonies in the State of Washington and, as a result, "was committed to 30 
months incarceration." (R., pp.180-81.) Olson admitted the allegations in both 
reports of violation. (Tr., p.36, L.21 - p.49, L.18.) 
Before the disposition hearing, Olson filed a Motion To Determine Credit 
For Time Served. (R., pp.196-99.) In the motion, Olson argued he was legally 
entitled to credit for the time he spent in custody since being served with the 
Idaho warrant on or about April 25, 2011. (R., pp.197-98.) "In the interests of 
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justice," he also sought credit or, alternatively, a reduction of his sentence, for 
the 250 days he served in Washington as a sanction for violating the conditions 
of his community custody in that state. (R., p.198.) Specificaliy, Olson argued: 
Mr. Olsen [sic] was in the State of Washington via interstate 
compact. The Washington Department of Correction imposed 250 
days of time on Mr. Olsen [sic] while he was pending disposition of 
his new charges. He is entitled to credit for that time. The 
attached documents show that Mr. Olsen [sic] was "sentenced" to 
250 days if Idaho did not extradite him back immediately. Idaho did 
not extradite him back until this year. 
it is unclear what authority Washington had to impose any 
time on Mr. Olsen [sic] but they did. In the interests of justice Mr. 
Olsen [sic] should be credited for that time. In the alternative Mr. 
Olsen [sic] requests that his sentence be modified to show a 
reduction of those 250 days. 
(R., p.198.) 
At the disposition hearing on July 9, 2012, the district court took up the 
issue of Olson's entitlement to credit for time served. (Tr., p.53, L. 1 - p.56, L.7.) 
The court ultimately determined Olson was entitled to credit for a total of 575 
days served, reflecting 100 days of prejudgment incarceration and 475 days of 
incarceration following service of the Idaho warrant. (Tr., p.55, L.20 - p.56, L.1.) 
Counsel for Olson agreed that 575 days "seems like the appropriate calculation" 
(Tr., p.56, Ls.4-6) and requested that, in addition to being given credit for time 
served, Olson's sentence also be reduced by at least the 250 days he served as 
a sanction in Washington before he was served with the Idaho warrant (Tr., p.57, 
L.20 - p.59, L.12). Specifically, counsel argued: 
So what we're asking for, Your Honor, is that if the court 
does chose [sic] to impose time, that he be given credit for time 
served, as well as a reduction by at least that 250 days, that he be 
given the opportunity to parole here and/or be placed on probation 
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can get to Vvashington and complete 
l p. 2 59, 3-5 ("[W]e'd ask a 
reduction in his sentence to allow him out on a probation and to get back to 
Washington to parole."), p.59, Ls.6-12 ("[W]e'd ask that his sentence be reduced 
that 250 days at a minimum .... ").) 
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court revoked 
Olson's probation and imposed his underlying sentence. (Tr., p.63, L.17 - p.64, 
L.4.) However, recognizing Olson had already spent a significant amount of time 
in custody, the court reduced Olson's sentence from seven years, with two years 
fixed, to seven years, with only one year fixed. (Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.64, L.B.) 
Consistent with its earlier calculation, the court also gave Olson credit for 575 
days served, making Olson immediately parole eligible. (Tr., p.64, L.9.) Olson 
timely appealed from the court's order revoking probation and executing the 
reduced sentence. (R, pp.211-19, 228-31, 233-37.) 
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ISSUE 
the 
the err it Olson's 
Credit for Time Served for the 250 days imposed by the State of 
Washington and served in the Okanogan County Jail pursuant to a 
decision in Washington to sanction Mr. Olson for violating the terms 
of his community custody agreement? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Olson failed to show the district court erred by not giving him credit 
for the jail time he served in Washington before being arrested on the Idaho 
warrant? 
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ARGUMENT 
Olson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Not Giving Him Credit 
For The Jail Time He Served In Washington Before Being Arrested 
On The Idaho Warrant 
A. Introduction 
Before he was arrested on the Idaho \/Varrant Of Arrest For Probation 
Violation, Olson served 250 days in the Okanogan County Jail as a sanction for 
violating his community custody agreement in Washington state. (R., pp.141-43, 
197, 200.) Olson argues on appeal that the district court erred by not giving him 
credit toward his Idaho sentence for those 250 days. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.) 
Olson's argument fails. At the disposition hearing, Olson agreed with the court's 
calculation of credit for time served and asked the district court to reduce his 
sentence to reflect the 250 days he served in Washington before being arrested 
on the Idaho warrant, and the district court granted that request; Olson's 
appellate claim of entitlement to credit for time served is therefore precluded by 
the doctrine of invited error. Alternatively, correct application of the law shows 
Olson has no legal entitlement to the credit he seeks. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct App. 1989)). The construction and application of a statute 
also presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free 
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State v. Robinson, 143 p 730 
v. Schwartz, 1 360, 7 9, 1 
C. Olson Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Claiming The 
District Court Erred By Not Giving Him Credit For The 250 Days He 
Served In Washington Before Being Arrested On The Idaho Warrant 
··it has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain 
of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, 
or invited are not reversible." State v. Dunlap,_ P.3d _, 2013 WL 4539806, 
*27 (Idaho Aug. 27, 2013) (quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 
P.2d 436, 438 (1983)) (internal citations omitted). The purpose of the invited 
error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in 
prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that 
decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 
(1999). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during 
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P .2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990). 
After Olson admitted to having violated the conditions of his probation, he 
filed a Motion To Determine Credit For Time Served in which he asked the 
district court, "in the interests of justice," to give him credit toward his sentence 
for the 250 days he served in Washington as a sanction for violating his 
community custody agreement or, alternatively, to modify his sentence "to show 
a reduction of those 250 days." (R., pp.197-98.) At the July 9, 2012 disposition 
hearing, Olson's attorney agreed with the court's determination that Olson was 
entitled to credit for 575 days served, reflecting 100 days of prejudgment 
incarceration and 475 days of incarceration following service of the Idaho bench 
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warrant (Tr., p.55, L.9 p.56, L.6.) Then, than asking the court to give 
credit 250 days in VVashington before being on 
the Idaho warrant, Olson's attorney specifically asked the court to reduce Olson's 
sentence "by at least [those] 250 days" so that he would be immediately parole 
eligible. (Tr., p.57, L.20 - p.58, L 12; see also Tr., p.59, Ls.3-12.) The district 
court effectively granted that request and reduced the fixed portion of Olson's 
sentence by one year. (Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.64, L.9.) Having agreed with the 
court's calculation of credit for time served, and having specifically invited the 
court to reduce his sentence to reflect the 250 days he served in Washington -
not to give him additional credit toward his sentence therefor - Olson cannot 
successfully complain on appeal that the district court erred by granting his 
request for a reduction of sentence rather than giving him credit toward his 
sentence for those 250 days. Olson's appellate claim is barred by the doctrine of 
invited error. 1 
1 It is apparent from the court's comments at the disposition hearing that it 
reduced Olson's sentence in recognition of Olson's request that his sentence be 
modified to reflect the time he spent in custody during his probationary period. If 
this Court determines Olson's appellate argument is not precluded by the invited 
doctrine and that Olson is entitled to credit toward his sentence for the 250 days 
he served in Washington between March and November 2010, the state 
respectfully submits the appropriate remedy would be to remand this case for 
resentencing; otherwise, Olson would get a windfall in the form of credit for time 
served and the reduction of his sentence that was intended by the district court 
to compensate Olson for the time he spent in custody before being finally 
adjudicated in violation of his probation. 
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D Alternatively, Olson Has Failed To Show Any Statutory Entitlement To 
Credit For The 250 Days He Served In Washington Before Being Arrested 
On The Idaho Bench Warrant 
to intent" is words 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. State v. Doe, 1 
Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written. 
McLean v. Maverick County Stores. Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation, it is the court's duty to give the statute that 
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that 
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was 
"palpably absurd"). 
Idaho Code § 19-2603 governs a defendant's entitlement to credit for time 
served upon execution of the defendant's sentence following a probation 
violation. Specifically the statute provides: 
Pronouncement and execution of judgment after 
violation of probation. - When the defendant is brought before 
the court in such case, it may, if judgment has been withheld, 
pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, 
or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the 
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be 
executed according to law, and the time such person shall have 
been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted 
as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the 
defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such 
bench warrant. 
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I.C. § 19-2603 (bolded emphasis original, italicized added). Pursuant 
the plain language of this statute, a whose probation is revoked as 
a result of a probation violation is only entitled to credit toward his sentence 
the time he served from the date of service of the bench warrant on the 
violation(s). Id.; accord State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 127, 922 P.2d 419, 424 
(Ct. App. 1996) ("Section 19-2603 provides that if a probationer has been 
arrested and probation revoked as a result of a violation, the defendant's 
incarceration from the time of service of the bench warrant will count as part of 
the sentence." (footnote omitted)); State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280, 954 P.2d 
1075, 1076 (Ct. App. 1998) (same). The language of the statute makes no 
provision for entitlement to credit for time served in custody as a condition of 
probation. I.C. § 19-2603; see also State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 43 P.3d 765 
(2002) (defendant not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of 
probation); State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 826 P.2d 1320 (1992) (same). 
In this case, it is undisputed that, while in Washington pursuant to an 
Interstate Compact, Olson violated the conditions of his community custody 
agreement in that state and was sanctioned with 250 days incarceration in the 
Okanogan County Jail, beginning on March 24, 2010. (R., pp.141-43, 200.) 
However, Idaho did not institute probation revocation proceedings against Olson 
until April 2011 (R., p.113), and the actual Warrant Of Arrest For Probation 
Violation was served on Olson on or about April 25, 2011 (R., pp.197, 202-03; 
Tr., p.54, L.8 - p.55, L.19). Applying the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 that 
only allows credit for time served from the date of service of the bench warrant 
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for a probation violation, Olson was only entitled to credit for the time he served 
from the April 25, 2011 service of the bench warrant; he was not entitled to credit 
toward his sentence for the 250 days he served in Washington before being 
served with the Idaho warrant. 
Olson argues otherwise. Specifically, he contends that, by sanctioning 
him with 250 days jail time for violating the conditions of his community custody 
agreement in Washington state, Washington was holding him "on the functional 
equivalent to a bench warrant," such that he was entitled under LC. § 19-2603 to 
credit toward his sentence for that time spent in custody. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-
6.) To support his position, Olson relies on Buys, supra. Olson correctly notes 
that, in Buys, the Court of Appeals held Buys was entitled to credit for time 
served pursuant to an "order of incarceration" - entered by the district court 
before the issuance of any bench warrant on Buys' alleged probation violations -
based on its determination that the "order of incarceration" "appear[ed] to be the 
functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued as a consequence of an alleged 
violation of probation terms." Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 922 P.2d at 424-25. 
Olson's reliance on the rationale of Buys to establish his entitlement to credit for 
the 250 days he served in Washington before being served with the Idaho 
Warrant Of Arrest For Probation Violation is unavailing for at least two reasons. 
First, the rationale of Buys - that a defendant is entitled to credit for time 
served on orders that are the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant - is 
inconsistent with the unambiguous language of I.C. § 19-2603 that only permits 
credit for time served from the date of service of the actual bench warrant. 
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Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must apply statute as written. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96, 265 P.3d at 508-09 
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous 
language of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). To the extent Buys holds 
otherwise, it was wrongly decided in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's later 
opinion in Verska and should therefore be overruled. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 
6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) (controlling precedent must be followed "unless it 
is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice"). 
Second, the facts of Buys are distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
The defendant in Buys was arrested in Idaho for violating the conditions of his 
Idaho probation. In this case, Olson was arrested in Washington state for 
violating the conditions of his community custody agreement in that state. The 
state recognizes Olson was being supervised in Washington pursuant to an 
Interstate Compact, but the state is unaware of any authority, and Olson has 
identified none, that would permit Washington to effectively execute a portion of 
Olson's Idaho sentence. Nor does it appear from the record that that was the 
Washington hearing officer's intent. (See R., pp.141-43, 200 (sanctioning with 
local jail time in lieu of returning to sending state)). 
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 only allows credit for time 
served from the date of service of the bench warrant for a probation violation, 
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Olson is not entitled under the statute to credit toward his sentence for the 250 
days he served in Washington before being arrested on the Idaho Warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order that revoked Olson's probation, executed a reduced sentence and gave 
Olson credit for 575 days served. 
DATED this 11 th day of December 2013. 
.,,,.-----, 
. -f /2--&: 
<~LORI A. FLEMING ,. 
Deputy Attorney GerteFaJ______.} 
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